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Abstract. This paper clarifies a long-standing ambiguity in the notion of social repre-
sentations; it provides a clear operational definition of the relation between social representa-
tion and individual representation. This definition, grounded in the theory of sets, supports 
most current empirical investigation methods of social representations. In short, a social rep-
resentation of an object in a population is the mathematical set of individual representations 
the individuals of that population have for this object. The components of the representation 
are the components used to describe this set, in intension in the mathematical sense of  
the term (in contrast with a definition in extension). Statistical techniques, as well as content 
analysis techniques, can construct such components by comparison of individual representa-
tions to extract commonalities, and that is what classic investigations on social representations 
indeed do. We then answer the question: how come that, in a given culture, individuals hold 
individual representations that are so similar to one another? 
Key words: social representations, individual representations, installation theory, in-
tersubjective understanding of objects 
 
 
The intersubjective understanding of objects 
Experience shows that members of a population each hold similar individual 
representations of many “objects” of their culture. By “objects”, I mean material 
objects (chairs, bottles…), material compounds of “things that move together”  
(a suit, a fleet …), conceptual objects (space, time, democracy…) and even hete- 
rogeneous compounds that “go together” (city, hospital, dinner…). This can be 
easily checked: people are able to name objects properly (“this is a chair”), coope- 
rate locally using indexicals (“pass me the salt please”) or even communicate 
complicated arrangements of complex objects (e.g. “discharge this patient from 
the hospital tomorrow”). 
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316                                                                             THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY 
So, (1) we are able to connect a phenomenon external to our mind (the “ob-
ject”) to a mental structure internal to our mind (the “representation”) that mat- 
ches the object in some structural or functional manner, such that the representa-
tion will enable recognition of the object and acting upon it in a relevant manner, 
and (2) for a given object, different individuals in each culture appear to each hold 
similar representations, to the effect they can communicate and act in a relevant 
manner about that object.  
Let us call this phenomenon (empirical facts 1+2 above) the intersubjective 
understanding of objects as we need a shorthand to discuss the nature of social 
representations. That Intersubjective Understanding of Objects (IUO) is not mere-
ly about communication. It comes with the constructivist assumption that partici-
pants refer to “the same Object”. When I say “pass me the salt” to my neighbor at 
the dinner table, we both assume that we talk about this little container of white 
powder on the table. That seems obvious. Now if I tell my neighbor in the voting 
line “please vote for the best candidate for democracy” we realize that the agree-
ment on “What You Think is What I Think” is not so trivial, since my predicate 
“best candidate for democracy” can refer to different objects of the world for me 
and my fellow citizen in the voting line. Still, intersubjective understanding works 
well enough for most everyday objects; and therefore this” psycho-social pact” 
that “What you See is What I See” (“the implicit agreement by which the Partici-
pants agree that their respective individual views refer to a single object” (Lahlou, 
2006)) is at the root of our social construction of reality, and of the naïve realism 
that is the implicit assumption behind our everyday life interactions.  
While the above IUO may appear obvious as an empirical fact, in practice 
that means members of a culture each individually house “similar” mental repre-
sentations for thousands of “objects”; that is remarkable and a priori improbable. 
This improbable fact nevertheless grounds our capacity to act as members of  
a culture, grounds the IUO. How come we different individuals have similar rep-
resentations? This problem of “common knowledge” and “common sense” has 
been theorized extensively by Serge Moscovici and his school, with the concept 
of “social representations” since his seminal work (Abric, 1994; Doise, Pal- 
monari, 1986; Duveen, Lloyd, 1990; Farr, 1987; Flament, 1994; Herzlich, 1969; 
Jodelet, 1989b, 1991; Moscovici, 1961, 1976). 
Social representations are: 
– “a form of practical knowledge linking a subject to an object” (Jodelet, 
1989a; my translation. – S.A.); 
– “it is a form of knowledge, socially elaborated and shared, with a practical 
aim and contributing to the construction of a reality common to a social set” 
(Jodelet, 1989a; my translation. – S.A.). 
These definitions highlight that a social representation has an object,  
and a population of subjects using this representation in intentional manner re-
garding that object.  
To facilitate the discussion below, let us fix a few definitions: 
– the Object of representation is what the representation “is a representation 
of”: in practice what the representation stands for in thought or communication.  
E.g., the Object of “the representation of psychoanalysis” is: psychoanalysis; 
– the Population is the set of individual subjects who use this representation. 
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The representation appears “social” in two aspects: in its genesis, as it is so-
cially constructed, and also in that IUO property described above, that it seems, 
empirically, to be “common” to all members of a Population who can identify it 
as such in practice (“this is the Object!”). In practice, IUO can be built into an em- 
pirical test that members of a Population refer to the same Object (Moliner, 1993). 
The phenomenon that members of a culture apparently give the same name 
to the same “thing”, or connect the same Object to their individual representation, 
has often been described as members of a culture “sharing” representations.  
In fact, individuals do not “share” the representations, they each merely host simi-
lar individual representations, just as two people wearing the same model of shoes 
do not “share” their shoes: they merely each own similar shoes.  
Alas the seminal texts on social representations failed to address the onto-
logical issue clearly: there seemed to be no ontological difference between social 
representations and individual (mental) representations. In fact, reading them one 
could assume that social representations were a specific type of individual, men-
tal, representation: the ones that were “shared”, and by this we should understand 
that each individual would house his or her own exemplar of “the” social repre-
sentation, just like at some point in history each good Chinese citizen would have 
his/her own copy of Mao’s little red book. This seems acceptable if every indivi- 
dual would hold the exact same representation. Then there would be no need to 
distinguish individual representation from social representation.  
But this it does not fit with the empirical evidence. Different persons do 
hold slightly different individual representations of the Object. This seems at first 
a detail, but the devil is in the detail. Because what is not exactly identical is onto-
logically different. So, would there be as many social representations as there are 
individuals in the Population? Henceforth we do not know what “social represen-
tation” we talk about if there are many different ones. Researchers using the social 
representations concept have all, including from the very start Moscovici himself, 
been confronted to that problem. 
Individual differences in representation 
To clarify, let us look more closely at the empirical process of studying so-
cial representations. To analyze social representations (SR) of the Object, what we 
collect are individual representations (IR) of the Object. Typically, members of 
the Population are asked to describe the Object, through interviews, question-
naires or some other device. The social representation is then usually considered 
what is “common” to those discourses collected. Indeed, usually there are many 
similarities between the material collected on the various individuals. There are 
also some differences. The empirical finding that individual versions of a social 
representations are somewhat different must be accounted for since individuals 
are supposed to have “the same” social representation. This generated a series of 
theoretical responses which were operational in practice but, as I argue below, are 
epistemically inappropriate.  
Moscovici was the first to encounter the problem of differences in IR. He ad-
dressed that issue by considering there are different types of social representations, 
depending on their stage of development. The representations can be Hegemonic, 
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Emancipated or Polemical (Moscovici, 1988), depending on the degree of consen-
sus (in practice: of similarity) of individual representations of the Object among 
the Population. Remember the theory initially addressed unfamiliar Objects that 
would be made familiar through the construction of a social representation.  
For example, when a new Object enters the social field (e.g. Psychoanalysis, 
AIDS) there might be some conflicting views in different segments of the Popula-
tion, hence several competing versions of the (“polemical”) social representation. 
But in the end, when the social group has reached some consensual view, the rep-
resentation may become hegemonic (everybody has the same IR). So, the differ-
ences would simply account for SR in the making, fully bloomed SRs would be 
hegemonic: everyone hosts the same. 
But in fact, there always remain some differences in a Population regarding 
an Object, especially according to socio-economic status. Willem Doise came up 
with the notion of position taking (Doise, 1986) regarding the Object (“prises de 
position”): this may account for the fact that in practice we collect different ver-
sions from different subjects, even for Objects that have been around for a long 
time. In other words, for the problem at hand here (but of course that is a carica-
tural interpretation of Doise’s excellent work which sheds important light on the 
nature of representations) there would be different representations because there 
are different Populations, each having its own perspective. Still, as in the detail 
everyone hosts a slightly different representation, there would be in full rigor as 
many Populations as individuals? 
Another empirical issue occurred. It turns out that even the same person can 
mobilize different IR of the Object in different circumstances. For example,  
one might exhibit a scientifically correct representation but, in some cases,  
use another one (e.g., magical, religious, traditional, etc.) To address this issue, 
Moscovici, in his seminal book on social representations, came up with the notion 
of “cognitive polyphasia” (Moscovici, 1976. P. 282): the idea that different kinds 
of knowledge, possessing different rationalities can coexist in an individual or  
a population. That notion, while locally dealing with the empirical facts, raises 
serious epistemic issues: if there is polyphasia, which of the various versions “is” 
the social representation? Or are there different objects? Interestingly, Moscovici 
writes a series of caveats about the limitations of theories in general1 and suggests 
that much research remains to be done on social representations.  
Finally, it was noted empirically that the representations that are given ex-
plicitly by people are in some cases not exactly what they think. Respondents tend 
to give investigators “politically correct” versions of the representation – a case of 
the desirability bias, and more generally of the responses bias where respondents 
tend to tell the researcher what they think the researcher wants to hear (Rosenthal, 
1966). For example, respondents would not make explicit that their representation 
of the unemployed people includes laziness. Abric and collaborators described 
this as the “mute zone” of social representations (Abric, 2003a).This draws our 
attention to the idea that what we observe empirically are IR expressed by indi-
 
1 “Une théorie ne recouvre jamais les données empiriques. Elle est débordée et les déborde” 
(Moscovici, 1976. P. 289). 
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vidual subjects, while “social representations” are a research construct, designed 
to address the phenomenon of mutual social understanding (IUO).  
In short, the assumption has usually been made that the observables (sub-
jects’ discourse) are of the same nature as the construct (social representation). 
This assumption is not explicit in the literature; but it is clear, from the way  
the empirical material (usually discourse, or items of discourse) is collected, ana-
lyzed, and directly used into the description of the social representation,  
that we act as if these two entities (IR expressed by subjects, and SR constructed 
by the researcher) were made of the same epistemic fabric. I will argue here that it 
is not the case. 
A formal definition of social representations,  
and two ways they can be described 
As noted above, there is ambiguity in the core texts regarding the epistemic 
status of social representations; this has been noted many times, right from the early 
days of the theory’s success (Billig, 1988; Jahoda, 1988; McKinlay, Potter, 1987; 
Potter, Edwards, 1999; Potter, Litton, 1985; Potter, Wetherell, 1987). The lack or 
formalism in the definitions allows looseness in the discussion. The confusion be-
tween individual and social representation has been detrimental to the advance-
ment of the theory. So let us clarify here.  
An Individual representation (IR) of an Object O is a symbolic structure that 
an individual subject uses to deal cognitively with the Object. This structure 
“stands for” the Object in thought, communication and action. A representation 
can be embodied (in the form of neural network); it can be projected onto some 
medium or support (speech, writing, drawing), etc.  
A Social representation (SR) of an object O in the population P is the set of 
individual representations of O in the population P. E.g., the social representa-
tion of “Contraception” in the UK will be the full set of all IR of what contracep-
tion is for the members of the British population (a set of more than 60 million IR).  
IR and SR are different in nature and logical type. IRs are included in  
the SR, but the SR is not an IR. A set cannot be an element of itself. So, no indi-
vidual can “have” a SR, individuals can only have IRs. 
Still, as IRs of a given Object in a Population tend to be similar, each indi-
vidual usually does hold an IR that has characteristics similar to the modal or  
the mean IRs in the population. I. e. the components of that specific individual’s 
IR will usually be similar to those of the other individuals in the population.  
E.g. most individuals in the population will know that “contraception” has some-
thing to do with avoiding reproduction when having intercourse, and most people 
will be aware of the usual means for this (pill, condoms etc.) But there will be in-
dividual variations in knowledge and attitude, and variations in practice, between 
individuals and even for a given individual according to circumstances; there will 
also be variations in what people say about it and likely there will be some mute 
zones (e.g. depending who subjects talk to); etc.  
So how can we describe social representations properly? Mathematically,  
in the theory of sets (Cantor, 1874; Halmos, 1974; Runde, 2005) a set can be de-
scribed in intension or in extension. An intensional description defines a set by 
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some properties (predicates) of its elements (usually a rule or semantic descrip-
tion; necessary and sufficient conditions). E.g. an intensional definition of “Birds” 
could be “Animals with wings”: {x│x ∈ Animals: x has wings}. An intensional 
definition of the clients of a Bank B would be the list of holders of an account in 
that bank {x│x has an account in Bank B}. 
An extensional definition explicitly lists all the individual elements of  
the set. An extensional definition of the clients of a bank would be the listing of 
all the names of these clients. Extensional definitions are accurate and explicit, 
nevertheless they usually (unlike for the Bank B case above) become impractical 
for large sets. E.g., an extensional definition of birds would be the (very long) list 
of all the individual birds on the planet (millions of individuals). 
The problem with describing social representations 
Social representations, as any set, can be defined in intension or in exten-
sion. In practice, because of the huge size of the sets of human Populations,  
SRs are defined in intension. This definition is empirically obtained through sta-
tistical techniques, by inferring the properties of the social representation from  
a sample of the set.  
Individual mental representations are observable empirically, for instance by 
asking a sample of individuals to talk about the object (e.g., “If I tell you ‘Democ-
racy’, what comes to your mind?”). From this sample one extracts (through con-
tent analysis) a description of the elements of the set of IRs. Then one infers sta-
tistically the intensional definition of the set. For example, the SR of “Studying” 
is found by (Lheureux et al., 2008) to contain the following cognitive compo-
nents: Knowledge, Investment, Diploma, Culture, Future, Work, Job, Long term, 
University; this is obtained through questionnaires filled in by a sample of stu-
dents. The set (SR) can then be described in intension by these components which 
are characteristic of the elements (IRs) of the set. 
What is tricky is that, when we describe the SR, we use words to refer to 
content traits, just as we do use words when we describe IRs. For example: 
“Knowledge”, “Diploma”, “Culture”, “University” are typical components of in-
dividual representations of “Studying”; and it is the same words we use to de-
scribe the components of the social representation of Studying. This is dangerous 
because there is a difference in logical type (Russell, 1908; Whitehead, Russell, 
1962) between IR and SR; and making confusions between logical types brings 
errors and paradoxes. 
If we do not distinguish properly, with the right formalism, between the el-
ement (IR) and the set (SR), we may attribute to the SR (the set) properties that 
lay in the element (IR), and vice-versa. While for some properties that is not prob-
lematic, for others that is a recipe for disaster. Rom Harré aptly spotted the issue 
in a critic of social representation theory (Harré, 1984):  
“The weight of an army is a distributive property, while its organization is a 
property of the collective. As far as I can see, the concept of représentation so-
ciale is used by the French school as a distributive property of groups”. 
Let us illustrate with the analogous problem of the biological species.  
We could account for the fact that in the species of Dogs there are small and big 
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dogs by saying that the species is Polemical and not Hegemonic, or account for 
the fact that not all dogs bark when observed by calling “barking” a mute zone of 
the species, etc. But describing the Dog species as a population is a more rigorous 
approach because it acknowledges the various factors of diversity in the popula-
tion. We do not need to invent names of properties for the Dog species (the set) to 
account for the distribution of some individual characteristics (e.g., size) across 
elements of the species (individual dogs). 
Defining social representations as the set of individual social representations 
is a clean epistemic solution to the problem of the relation between IR and SR. 
Interestingly, this theoretical clean-up has little practical implication on the way 
social representations research is done, because researchers have in their empirical 
practice always acted as if the SR is a set of IR.  
Indeed, as said above, when a set is described, it is done so usually in inten-
sion as the list of common properties of the elements of the set (“a Mammal”, 
“that barks”, etc.). And in practice social representation specialists do indeed ex-
tract these common properties by comparing individual representations. That is 
precisely extracting a representative sample of the set of individual representa-
tions – implicitly acting as if the social representation was that set- and then find-
ing commonalities of the elements of that set, to infer an intensional definition of 
the set based on these commonalities. 
Nevertheless, this clarification has theoretical implications, and considering 
SR as sets it is necessary to take an evolutionary perspective (Lahlou, 2015). In-
deed it is through the variation of individual representations that the social repre-
sentation evolves, just as a natural biological species (e.g. Finches) evolves as 
a population through the variation of individuals. That is why this new definition, 
which is operational in practice and epistemically appropriate, should be used.  
It is also, as we’ll hint below with the theory of the medium (Bachimont, 2004), 
essential to understand how the characteristics of the individual influence the op-
eration of the representation and its processing into action. 
In passing, our definition clarifies in terms of statistical distribution what are 
the different types of social representation – hegemonic vs polemical etc. In heg-
emonic representation the set has little variance, while in polemical representa-
tions there will be subsets of the population that are homogeneous as a subset but 
differ markedly from the other subsets. And for “cognitive polyphasia”: a given 
individual can have several IRs of the “same” Object, which they use alternatively 
according to the circumstances in which the Object appears (e.g., the same person 
might use different contraception methods depending on the situation). 
A social representation is more than a set of similar representations 
The theory of sets brings us useful formalism to distinguish the nature and 
logical type of social vs individual representations. Nevertheless it does not do 
justice to what a SR is: a SR is more than a set of similar IR. It gathers IR that are 
linked both functionally (to their Object) and socially (to their Population). 
The IRs that constitute an SR emerged to facilitate action and communica-
tion about an Object of the life-world, among a specific population (e.g. how Bri- 
tish people should deal with contraception, how students and teachers should deal 
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with education, etc.) That is the intersubjective understanding of objects (IUO) 
alluded to in introduction. Therefore, those IR of the same SR all point to the same 
empirical phenomenon “out there” and their content is designed for operational 
effectiveness of the representation, for practice and communication. Simply said, 
representations must “match” reality well enough to enable the Population to deal 
efficiently with the Object. 
IRs are not independent of each other within the Population. In practice,  
as members of the population communicate and cooperate, their IRs crossbreed: 
there is discussion, controversy, influence, education. That stirring facilitates ho-
mogeneity of the set of IRs. 
These two aspects (functional and social) are intertwined because practice is 
a social process. In society, people communicate-and-act all-together-in-the-same-
movement. 
To sum up, a SR is a set of IRs which are linked together because they refer 
to the same Object in a given Population. They are connected together by the so-
cial practice of that Object in that Population, and they are linked to the Object 
and the Population by the process of social construction of the Object, by which 
practice continuously reconstructs the Object. 
There is inevitably variability between the IRs, within individuals and across 
individuals. The variability reflects the different practices which different mem-
bers of the population have with the object, across time and space. Still this varia-
bility is limited by the functional constraints of practice and communication,  
as those who actually co-interact with the object must have a minimum of com-
mon ground to interact. These functional restrictions ensure the coherence of  
the SR into more than a random set of similar IRs. That is why SR differ from 
“memes” (Dawkins, 1976), and more generally why Social Representations theo-
ry is different from the naïve approach of “shared” representations, which consi- 
ders a set of multiple replicated occurrences of a single representation, “copies” 
distributed over a population.  
That was a clarification of what has for too long being ambiguity in the theory. 
Defining social representations as sets of IRs is consistent with the very spirit of 
the concept. In fact, as noted above, all the empirical work on social representa-
tion is implicitly based on the idea that a social representation is a set, of which 
the characteristics are obtained by sampling elements (individual representations) 
from that set, and describing their characteristics based on what traits they have in 
common, which is typically the process of describing a set in intension. Retro-
spectively, the definition of SR as sets of IRs provides solid epistemological 
ground for all techniques that describe SR based on surveys on samples of IR – 
in fact the immense majority of the studies in the field. So, we do not have to 
throw out the baby with the bathwater: most empirical work on social representa-
tions lays on solid epistemic ground – even though the theory was ambiguous. 
Why individual representations are similar? 
Now we have a proper definition of a SR, we can address the question  
behind the intersubjective understanding of objects: how come that, in a given 
culture, individuals all hold individual representations that are so similar to  
one another? 
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Individual representations can be learned by education, by communication 
and by practice. In the two first cases, it is obvious that representations are in 
some way replicated from one individual to another, and therefore will be similar, 
albeit minor losses in translation. Diffusion of IR through these mechanisms  
accounts for similarity between individual representations among members of  
the same culture (Lahlou, 1996; Sperber, 1996).  
But that does not cover all cases. Individuals who have never communicated 
may have similar representations. Furthermore, mere communication only pro-
vides theoretical knowledge of the object; but in many cases direct experience is 
necessary to support actual practice, as is well known in instruction and training. 
Let us now look at construction of representations through practice.  
The relation of representation to practice is (under various names and guises) 
a major topic in social science. Let us try to summarize in a paragraph what we 
know. In society, practices and representations reproduce each other (Berger, Luck- 
mann, 1966; Bourdieu, Passeron, 1977; Giddens, 1984). During social interaction, 
individuals learn to behave properly (Goffman, 1974; Mead, 1972; Rogoff, 2003; 
Schütz, 1944). They acquire a common knowledge and skills, about local practi- 
ces, typical of a culture (Abric, 1994; Bruner, 1999; Durkheim, 1898; Foucault, 
1978; Jodelet, 1989b; Moscovici, 1961; Vygotsky, 1986). This knowledge is em-
bodied in individuals and expressed in symbolic form (Barsalou, 2003; Freud, 
1895; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Lashley, 1951). Then, once embodied, in situation 
knowledge and skills, combined with mediating structures distributed in context, 
produce practices (Barker, 1968; Cicourel, 1992; Hutchins, 1995; Maturana, Varela, 
1980; Pea, 1993; Suchman, 1987). 
As we see, the (re)production of representations involves the context and ac-
tion in context; so that is where we must look for an explanation beyond education 
and communication.  
The short answer to our question is that members of a given Population hold 
similar representations because they interact with similar objects (those objects 
that make the life-world of that Population). But furthermore there are mecha-
nisms that channel individuals to learn, through similar practice, similar represen-
tations.  
Indeed, we could assume that, by trial and error, every individual would 
gradually construct, of a given Object, its own IR of that Object. Then,  
as all members of the Population interact with the same object, they would in  
the end converge. But trial and error is a slow process, and convergence is not 
guaranteed. Anyway, investigation shows that is not how things are done.  
There are socially constructed devices, “installations”, which channel behavior of 
members of a given population into predictable, typical, sequences. These instal-
lations include material affordances that guide action and social mechanisms of 
feed-back that reward those who use “proper” representations vs “improper” ones.  
Installation theory 
In society, individual behavior is predictable. Full grown members of a Po- 
pulation know how to behave in standard social situations such as “a dinner”,  
“at the dentist”, “a flea market”, “a shower”, “an election”, “a tribunal”, “a wed-
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ding”, “a conference”, etc. Sometimes we only know approximately, but when in 
situation the context and other people give us enough scaffolding and feed-back  
to channel us into the proper behavior. Let us call installations the specific, local, 
societal settings where humans are expected to behave in a predictable way  
(a dinner, an election, etc.) 
Installations consist of a set of components that simultaneously support  
and control individual behavior. The components are distributed in three layers:  
a) over the material environment (affordances2), b) the subject (embodied compe-
tences) and c) the social space (institutions3, enacted and enforced by other sub-
jects). These components assemble at the time and place the activity is performed. 
Installations channel individual behavior. The affordances provide feed-
forward and feedback. Representations and other embodied skills allow the sub-
ject to interpret the objects and the situation. Finally social feed-back funnels be-
havior into what is expected: proper behavior is reinforced by positive feed-back 
while improper behavior is extinguished by negative feed-back. Through the so-
cial feed-back (and also the outcome of behavior), operant conditioning takes 
place which facilitates embodiment of “what should be done in such situations”. 
For a detailed description, see (Lahlou, 2017).  
Let us take a simple example: when you take the train, from the moment 
you enter the station to the moment you step out of your destination station on ar-
rival, you take very few personal decisions: your behavior is channeled by a series 
of successive installations that guide and constrain your actions. You follow the flow. 
You still have some choices (which train, which car, which seat), but they are so-
cially constructed. Affordances limit your options: you can only use the doors, 
tracks and seats provided. Then again you are limited by conventions (you must 
sit on your assigned seat, otherwise someone will ask you to do so). You have 
some freedom of action as you seat, but you are mostly supposed to seat quietly. 
Etc. In the end, you behave “properly” as a train passenger. Installations channel 
behaviors by two complementary mechanisms: constructive and restrictive.  
In a constructive manner, they offer, suggest and support specific behaviors.  
In a restrictive manner, they prevent some behaviors and repress those consi- 
dered inappropriate. This ensures that everyone behaves as expected, a condition 
for cooperation. Cooperation is essential in a society, and social representations 
are a major instrument for cooperation (Lahlou, 2001). Most peculiar is this instal-
lation makes everyone behave properly, in a similar fashion that fits the cultural 
script of travelling by train”, whatever their age, gender, nationality, religion, so-
cial status, personality etc. Therefore, we can see installations can supersede all 
classic social, psychological, or economic variables. That is how installations 
manage to homogenize representations in a population. 
 
2 “Roughly, the affordances of things are what they furnish, for good or bad, which is what 
they afford the observer. ...they are ecological, in the sense that they are properties of the en- 
vironment relative to an animal. <...> Affordances do not cause behavior but constrain or control 
it” (Gibson, 1982). 
3 “[An institution is] a cluster of social usages. It connotes a way of thought or action of 
some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the habits of a group or the customs of  
a people. …The function of each is to set a pattern of behavior and to fix a zone of tolerance for  
an activity or a complement of activities” (Hamilton, 1932). 
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Note that IRs are embodied competences about a specific Object. Therefore, 
they are part of installations, they are a component of the embodied layer. 
The three layers of installations (affordances of the material environment, 
embodied competences in the subject, and social regulation by institutions) each 
limit and constrain behavior and leave open only some pathways. As the three 
layers act simultaneously, the paths that behavior can take are the ones that are 
compatible with each of the three layers (what is possible, what is thinkable, and 
what is allowed), which leaves only a rather narrow set of possibilities. Further-
more, the redundancy of the layers of determination makes installations very resi- 
lient. The resilience comes from the redundant combination of the constraining 
power of the three layers of their components. Where one layer of determination 
fails to scaffold and control, others may repair. For example, if in the train you sit 
by error in the wrong car, someone will likely tell you and point you to the right 
seat, as also indicated on your ticket. This means that where the embodied layer 
fails, the physical layer (affordances) and the social layer (social feed-back) may 
kick-in and repair. 
There are many types of social regulation that produce embodiment of skills 
that are conform to social expectation: Role and status, Imitation, Conformity and 
zeal, Seeking guidance, Instruction and guidance, Influence and persuasion, Vigi-
lante effect, Force and threat (Lahlou, 2017. Pp. 132–159). For a detailed descrip-
tion of how installations construct and reconstruct through practice embodied 
competences in general and representations in particular, refer to (Lahlou, 2017. 
Pp. 175–289). In short, installations produce similar individual experience, and hence 
similar IRs. This similarity is reinforced by communication, often prepared  
by education and training. And in return, the representations contribute to rebuild 
the installation and the Object, in a chicken-and-egg manner. I have no space to 
discuss further that point here. 
Individuals learn their IRs through practice. The IR of an Object is built by 
the various types of experiences connected to that Object (e.g. one will learn 
about Democracy through experiences of votes, collegial discussions, elections 
etc.) For many aspects of social life, practice is channeled by installations. So most 
these experiences about the Object tend to be channeled by installations; hence the 
IR of an Object tends to be constructed by the series of relevant installations pre-
sent in a culture. Because installations are resilient, they induce similar behavior 
in all individuals that use them (e.g. all students will get similar experience of 
Studying because schools are similar). Of course, education and communication, 
through vicariant experience and stories, contribute to organize individual experi-
ence into similar frameworks and to enshrine them into common language and 
discourse; but the connection between representation and practice is usually for-
matted by installations and within practice inside in installations. In this perspec-
tive, installations are a distributed formatting system for representation and prac-
tice that imprints similar IR into the members of a given Population.  
So, in large scale societies, installations are similar across a society (schools, 
airports, etc. are similar across the territory used by the Population). By using 
these installations, members of a Population are channeled into standard behaviors, 
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and therefore they get similar experience, embodied through operant conditioning, 
and hence they embody similar IR.  
The embodied aspect of representations is essential for practice because 
practice is the articulation of the individual representation in situation,  
and this articulation combines components of the bodily support with components 
of the context (Lahlou, 1998. Pp. 69–83). In this movement, the subject extracts 
from the environment components that match her motives and enacts a behavior 
stemming from her representations but adapted to the affordances of the situation. 
E.g., a hungry European subject will eat an apple or a sandwich, depending on 
what is available; but not a live slug, even though that may be comestible, because 
a slug does not match the social representation of “food” in that Culture. The reac-
tion of disgust coming from the bodily medium, as well as the sensation of hun-
ger, coming from the same, are essential in such process.  
More generally the consideration of the support medium of the representa-
tion is essential to the understanding of the functioning of the representation be-
cause the nature of the medium does condition the transformation of the structure 
into a process.  
For such considerations, the theory of the medium (“théorie du support”) by 
Bachimont comes handy. It states that (Bachimont, 2004): 
– knowledge is the ability to carry out an action for a given purpose (p. 65); 
– all knowledge is in its genesis the interpretation and manipulation of a ma-
terial medium (p. 63); 
– the material properties of the inscription medium condition the intelligibi- 
lity of the inscription (p. 78); 
– a thought is a reformulation carried out by the consciousness on the bodily 
medium which is the body-subject (p. 77). 
For example, the notion of “mute zone” of representations comes from  
the fact that there are, in the same bodily medium that hosts the IR of concern, 
other IR and cognitive processes that condition and filter the expression of  
the representation in each situation. As actions are executed by individuals,  
and not by a population, the relevant unit of analysis for the transformation of rep-
resentations into action and vice-versa is the individual, as that is the unit inscrip-
tion of representation and ascription of agency, rather than the Population.  
And at this point, using epistemically correct definitions of representations, 
whether IR or SR, is essential.  
Conclusion 
A social representation (SR) is a set of individual representations (IRs) of  
an Object by members of a Population of subjects who deal with this Object. 
These IRs are similar, and that similarity supports the intersubjective understan- 
ding of objects that characterizes a culture. SR are usually described in intension 
by listing commonalities of the elements of the set (IRs).  
What makes the set a social representation is not merely the similarity of 
IRs, but rather the relation of the Population to the Object of the SR, for which  
the SR is a functional, constructive instrument.  
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The similarity of IRs in a population is constructed by education and com-
munication, which homogenize IRs, but also by individual practice in relation to 
the Object. In large scale societies, practice is channeled by “installations”, local 
combinations of components that scaffold and control behavior and experience 
into standard paths of action. Members of a culture behave through similar instal-
lations. This generalized channeling of practice constructs similar experiences 
across the members of a Population, and therefore contributes to members of  
a given culture having similar IRs.  
This epistemic clarification has minor implication on the classic methods of 
investigation of SRs, which in practice operate by extracting similarities from  
a sample of IRs to construct definitions in intension of the SR. That is fortunate 
because it means we do not need to throw away the thousands of empirical papers 
using social representations theory. 
But this clarification has major theoretical implications for the study of the rela-
tion between representation and action. That is because the locus of interpretation of 
situations and of agency is the individual subject, not the Population. Therefore em-
bodiment of an IR in a human body, with the physiological and emotional aspects of 
that medium must be taken into account, as well as the coexistence and combination 
within the body of that specific IR with other IRs and more generally with a vast ar-
ray of cognitive processes. This issue of the nature of the location of the representa-
tion will become more and more relevant as representations get inscribed in more 
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Социальные представления  
и индивидуальные представления: в чем разница?  
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Аннотация. Проясняется давняя двусмысленность в толковании понятия соци-
альных представлений и дается четкое операциональное определение отношения меж-
ду «социальным представлением» и «индивидуальным представлением». Это опреде-
ление, основанное на теории множеств, поддерживает большинство современных эм-
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пирических методов исследования социальных представлений. Другими словами, со-
циальное представление объекта в популяции – это математический набор индивиду-
альных представлений, которые индивиды данной популяции имеют относительно это-
го объекта. Компоненты представления трактуются как компоненты, используемые для 
описания этого множества в математическом смысле данного термина. Статистические 
методы, как и метод контент-анализа, могут создавать такие компоненты путем срав-
нения индивидуальных представлений для извлечения общих черт, и именно этому по-
священы классические исследования социальных представлений. Предлагается ответ на 
вопрос: как получилось, что в конкретной культуре индивиды имеют индивидуальные 
представления, похожие друг на друга? 
Ключевые слова: социальные представления, индивидуальные представления, 
теория инсталляции, интерсубъективное понимание объекта 
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